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Institutional voids and organization studies: Towards an epistemological rupture  
Abstract 
In this essay, we critique the usage of the term ‘institutional void’ to characterize non-
Western contexts in organizational studies. We explore how ‘conceptual stretching’ of 
institutional voids – specifically, the theoretical and geographic expansion of the concept – 
has led not only to poor construct clarity, but also pejorative labeling of non-Western 
countries. We argue that research using this term perpetuates an ethnocentric bias by deifying 
market development and overlooking the richness and power of informal and non-market 
institutions in shaping local economic activity. We call for an ‘epistemological rupture’ to 
decolonize organizational scholarship in non-Western settings and facilitate contextually 
grounded research approaches that allow for more indigenous theorization. 
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‘Disorder is simply the order we are not looking for.’ 
H. Bergson (1969[1934]: 61, our translation) 
Institutional voids and organization studies: Towards an epistemological rupture  
In early 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly referred to African nations as 
well as Haiti and El Salvador as ‘shithole countries.’ While many decried his comments as 
unacceptable and racist, they were symptomatic of a more pervasive ethnocentric mindset, 
one that permeates even academia (e.g. Gilley, 2018). We argue that organizational 
scholarship is no exception, and is rife with implicit accounts of the superiority of the West 
vis-à-vis non-Western contexts. In this essay, we focus on the term ‘institutional voids,’ 
arguing that it has evolved into an academic euphemism for ‘shithole countries’. 
 Institutional void is a term often used by scholars seeking to characterize non-Western 
economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000b, 2010). Offering a contrast to Western markets, 
institutional voids are defined as contexts lacking ‘market-supporting and contract-
enforcement institutions to efficiently facilitate exchange between firms’ (Pinkham & Peng, 
2017, p. 1). For instance, strong legal institutions are seen as enabling both the enforcement 
of contracts and the development of equity markets necessary for financing firm growth (La 
Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). In the past two decades, the institutional 
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void concept has found traction in many academic domains as it offers a means to capture 
differences in non-Western contexts in a manner facilitating comparability with Western –  
and  particularly Anglo-Saxon – economies. The term is invoked, to various degrees, to 
account for the existence of conglomerates and business groups, family firms, social 
enterprises, and even NGOs (Anheier, 2014; Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen, & 
Van Oosterhout, 2011; Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012; Mair, Marti, & 
Ventresca, 2012). 
 Yet we argue that this concept is replete with vocabulary that privileges Western 
institutions (Banerjee, 2003; Dar, 2017). The idea of institutional voids is built on a narrow 
transaction cost conceptualization of institutions as regulatory ‘rules of the game’, ignoring 
a more holistic treatment of institutions as ‘regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provides stability and 
meaning to social life’ (Scott, 2014, p. 56). Further, we document a process of conceptual 
stretching (Sartori, 1970) in the literature using the term institutional void(s). We suggest that 
as Western social scientists have become increasingly interested in explaining non-Western 
contexts, they have resorted to ‘vague [and] amorphous conceptualizations’ (Sartori, 1970, 
p.1034) to increase the theoretical and geographical applicability of institutional voids. As a 
result, we argue that the burgeoning literature on institutional voids is driven by rote 
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application of the concept by researchers who are too often separated from the contexts about 
which they theorize. We contend that the concept’s increasing ‘extension’, i.e. ‘class of things 
to which a word applies’ (Sartori, 1970, p. 1051) has compromised its ‘intension’ or the 
collection of properties determining the things to which the word applies.  
The result, we argue, is an increasingly tenuous theoretical foundation and an 
unfounded benchmarking of foreign countries’ institutional systems against an idealized 
Western, and often Anglo-American model (Ozkazanc-Pan, 2008). What began as an attempt 
to move away from universalistic approaches to explore and theorize foreign institutional 
contexts has evolved, intentionally or not, into a pejorative and counterproductive portrayal 
of non-Western economies as institutionally inferior. Despite recent attempts to recast the 
concept in a less enthnocentric fashion (e.g. Mair et al., 2012), these efforts do not resolve 
the inherent teleological assumptions that non-Western countries ‘evolve’ towards more 
Western-style institutions – albeit with some local flavour. We suggest that the result is 
voluminous but inconsistent and biased knowledge accumulation, on institutional voids 
specifically and non-Western economies generally. 
Some organizational scholars propose that the conceptual creep of a term can be 
countered by a narrower and stricter adherance to construct boundaries (Hirsch & Levin, 
1999, p. 200). This is certainly part of the issue, although our criticism is targeted at the 
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normative implications stemming from the initial premises and overly reductionist 
application of the concept, which cannot be addressed by better definitions.  
Accordingly, we propose abandoning the label institutional voids altogether. 
Importantly, we are not implying that scholars using the term are bigoted or even that the 
term has not proven useful for advancing research. The initial intention in developing the 
term appears laudable, and we ourselves are cognizant that our own ethnocentric biases may 
color our interpretation of unfamiliar contexts. Nonetheless, we call for an ‘epistemological 
rupture’ (Bachelard, 1938) to decolonize current approaches to non-Western settings. As our 
opening quote from Bergson indicates, we suggest that the literature on institutional voids 
characterizes settings by disorder primarily because it fails to recognize pre-existing, 
alternative order(s). We call for an earnest pursuit of understanding these alternative 
arrangements to enable greater authenticity in theoretical development regarding non-
Western economies. 
 
Origins of institutional voids 
The institutional voids concept emerged in management and organization studies in 
the 1990s as scholars sought to reconcile theoretical developments in finance and institutional 
economics with patterns of corporate governance in non-Western countries (North, 1990). 
The notion was born of an obvious but important observation for the purposes of theoretical 
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development: non-western organizations are often highly distinct from their Western 
counterparts, with some measure of this variation attributed to local institutional 
arrangements (Leff, 1978).  
 Khanna and Palepu (1997) offered one of the most compelling contributions to this 
discussion, providing comparative accounts of business conduct and structure in foreign 
countries based on differences in ‘rules of the game’ – i.e. economic institutions – of 
exchange (North, 1990). In these accounts, many firm-level characteristics could be readily 
explained as organizational responses to the costs of transacting in the market, which in turn 
were based on the presence or absence of market-supporting institutions (Chang & Hong, 
2000; Chittoor, Kale, & Puranam, 2015). Large Asian conglomerates, for example, were 
inclined towards brand leverage, heavy vertical integration, interlocking directorates and 
intra-group trading arrangements to compensate for ‘information [asymmetry] problems, 
imperfect contract enforcement, inability to enforce property rights and flawed regulatory 
structure’ (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, p. 888). Settings that lacked the requisite market-
supporting institutions were labelled as institutional voids.  
 This early work of Khanna and Palepu leveraged explanations from New Institutional 
Economics to account for firm evolution in a multitude of non-Anglo-Saxon contexts. In 
contrast to sociological accounts, where institutions can be cultural-cognitive, normative and 
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regulative (Scott, 2014), Khanna and Palepu conceptualized institutions as purely regulative, 
market-enabling ‘rules of the game’ (cf. Mair et al., 2012, p. 821). Building upon arguments 
from Leff (1978), the authors specified an absence of specific regulatory institutions or 
market intermediaries (e.g. information intermediaries, regulation and contract enforcement) 
that resulted in inefficient capital, labor and product markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1997).  
 
Diffusion and conceptual stretching 
 The concept of instutional voids coined by Khanna and Palepu (1997) proved to be 
analytically tractable, producing a spate of studies. Figure 1 below presents the number of 
articles with institutional void(s) in the abstract of all results in the EBSCOhost Business 
Source Complete database. This data does not represent an exhaustive use of the concept, but 
does indicate its use within management and organization studies. We observe that use of the 
term has grown from a handful of articles a year in the late-1990s to 38 articles in the year 
2017 alone. ‘Institutional void’ has become institutionalized - with rapid growth in literature 
driven by an extension into scholarly domains, contexts, and phenomena quite removed from 
its origins. We suggest that this extension of applicability accompanies a process of 
conceptual stretching that has created a host of problems which we outline below. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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Problem 1: Narrow Scope, Broad Application 
Using the same corpus of articles from EBSCO, we also provide a map illustrating 
which countries/regions have been characterized by institutional voids. There is a clear 
extension of the term to cover an increasingly broad and diverse set of countries from 
Afghanistan (Hanekom & Luiz, 2017) to Zimbabwe (Davies & Torrents, 2017), with a 
particularly outsized emphasis on China. The term is even used to classify entire continents 
such as Africa (e.g. Getachew & Beamish, 2017) and Latin America (e.g. Castellacci, 2015). 
Oddly, developed countries like Taiwan (Luo & Chung, 2013) and Germany (e.g. Beveridge, 
2012) have also been labelled as institutional voids.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 Clearly the concept of institutional void has been applied with broad strokes. Further, 
we suggest that the focus on formal legal systems and judiciary enforcement of rules reflects 
an ethnocentric bias in the institutional void concept and a particular fetishization of the 
United States. In early work, Khanna and Palepu applied an important disclaimer that their 
work was not intended to foster the idea that ‘one institutional context [is] superior to others’ 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The conclusions of the institutional void literature, though, imply 
otherwise: given the premise that institutional voids are hindrances and that the US is an 
‘extreme example of a country where there are relatively few voids’ (Khanna & Palepu, 
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1997), the logical conclusion is that the US is a near-ideal institutional environment. Indeed, 
this is reinforced when institutional void is later defined more broadly as the ‘[…] absence 
in emerging markets of things we take for granted in our backyard in Boston’ (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2010). 
 Although the original formulation of the institutional void concept was narrow and 
US-centric, the increasing extension of the term results in nebulous conceptualization and 
inconsistent application. This creates a situation where it is not very clear what an 
institutional void is, but it is clear what an institutional void is not (i.e. a void is not the US). 
We suggest that this trajectory has undermined the theoretical fidelity of the concept, 
reinforcing problematic assumptions and fostering conceptual inaccuracy.  
 In more recent literature, the utilization of the institutional void label often veers away 
from the underlying legal and political frameworks and economic ‘rules of the game,’ and 
instead is conflated with anything that increases costs of transactioning. As an example, 
Khanna and Palepu (2010) recount an anecdote of Tetra-Pak overcoming the ‘specific 
institutional void’ of missing cold-chain distribution in Argentina. Their account identifies 
logistical failures in a particular industry as a contextual problem. Yet, it is not one that can 
be precisely attributed to any missing market-enabling institutions. This type of conflation is 
a recurring theme in this literature: deficiencies in telecommunications, transportation, or 
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physical infrastructure, for example, are observed as characteristics of non-Western countries 
and impediments to market-based transactions (Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 
2005). They are therefore considered as institutional voids or ‘rigidities’ (Fisman & Khanna, 
2004; Santangelo & Meyer, 2011), even if the link to the legal and political institutional 
environment is dubious. 
 In other situations, the presence rather than absence of a Western legal institution is 
considered to constitute an institutional void. Santangelo and Meyer (2011), for instance, 
consider that trade unions, a dominant feature in many continental European economies (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001) contribute to institutional voids: ‘[c]omplex decisions processes, such as 
negotiations with trade unions, create rigidities that slow down adjustment processes and 
raise barriers to exit’ (Santangelo & Meyer 2011: 898). Regulation in some areas is similarly 
viewed as an institutional void and hence undesirable; in the labour market, for instance, it 
potentially ‘greatly reduce[s] firms’ ability to lay off staff, or even to reassign employees to 
new roles’ (Santangelo & Meyer 2011: 899). As such, treating labour regulation as 
contributing to an institutional void is based on the (contested) assertion that labour markets 
function better with lower levels of regulation (cf. Deakin & Sarkar, 2008). This illustrates 
how the inherent ethnocentricity of the concept turns the literal meaning of institutional void 
(i.e. absence) on its head.  
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 The critiques we outline here demonstrate that the institutional void concept has been 
stretched into divergent conceptualizations of institutions. The concept simultaneously 
promotes a rigid and tractable set of principles, yet is undefined enough regarding basic 
terminology to allow for increased extension into new theoretical and phenomenological 
domains. The rampant ‘cherry-picking’ similarly extends to empirical and methodological 
issues, as we outline in the subsequent section.  
 
Problem 2: Empirical convenience and methodological shortcomings 
 Institutional voids are notoriously difficult to operationalize (Khanna & Rivkin, 
2001) with many empirical decisions driven either by convenience or rough approximations. 
Researchers have generally avoided measuring institutional voids by limiting their 
investigations to contexts which have been previously (and in our view often arbitrarily) 
labelled as institutional voids (e.g. Chittoor et al., 2015; Fisman & Khanna, 2004; 
Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2015), or they rely upon generic indices that evaluate the 
institutional ‘voidness’ of countries based on criteria such as ‘credit/equity market efficiency’ 
or ‘business freedom’ (Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kim, 2017). However, comparing these two 
approaches reveals a lack of consensus regarding what the defining properties (or intension) 
of an institutional void are. For instance, Taiwan, a country characterized as riddled with 
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institutional voids by Luo and Chung (2013) until 2005, ranked 11th that year in the IMD 
World Competition Scoreboard, ahead of ‘developed’ countries like New Zealand, Ireland 
and the U.K. (IMD, 2005), none of which are labelled as institutional voids in Figure 2. 
 In the handful of cases where authors more directly measure institutional voids (e.g. 
Santangelo & Meyer, 2011), survey items closely resemble economic freedom indices: e.g. 
‘experiencing substantive costs or delays’ due to procedures for registering a business, 
obtaining licenses, access to utilities, custom procedures or tax assessment and payments. 
Aside from the fact that many such survey items do not actually measure the absence of 
institutionalized rules, but rather their presence (e.g. specific custom procedures), these 
indices only have an indirect and tenuous empirical link to market development. 
 In further instances, studies using the institutional voids concept suffer from the 
flawed assumption that economic and institutional development within nations is 
homogenous. Entire countries or regions are often characterized as an institutional void, 
while in reality, there are stark differences across regions: In India, for example, a 2017 
corruption survey indicated that 77% of respondents in the state of Karnataka had 
experienced corruption in public services, compared with only 3% in the state of Himachal 
Pradesh (CMS, 2017). Similarly, in the 2010 Brazil census the illiteracy rate for the state of 
Sao Paolo was roughly equivalent to that of the US (2%), while in the impoverished state of 
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Alagoas, illiteracy was on par with Haiti (46%). If market-relevant outcomes are at least 
partially attributed to regulatory, legal and cultural traditions, we must recognize the 
heterogeneity in institutional arrangements across provinces and states. Using the term 
institutional void to indiscriminately characterize an entire nation reflects a preference for 
analytical simplicity over empiric complexity. The US is no exception: In 2010, ravaged by 
industrial decline, Detroit had a 27% unemployment rate, more than three times that of 
Boston. We sense that ‘the lack of things we take for granted in our backyard in Detroit‘ 
would be less compelling a formulation of institutional voids. 
 Admittedly, many institutional concepts suffer from this ‘myth of evenly-spread 
institutions’ (cf. Allen, 2004). With institutional voids though, the myth is selectively 
mobilized to support the premises of the argument. Prosperous, market-oriented enclaves in 
Western economies are presented as confirmation of a well-functioning national institutional 
arrangement. Conversely, in non-Western countries, dysfunctional regions and industries are 
portrayed as evidence of an institutional void that applies across the entire country. This 
approach artificially inflates the distinction between Western and non-Western countries. 
Problem 3: From ontological assumptions to conceptual imperialism 
Much of our critique is targeted at the transaction cost-based premises that undergird 
institutional voids, namely that 1) humans are opportunistic and self-interested by nature 
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(irrespective of context) and 2) markets naturally emerge if opportunism can be minimized 
and self-interest channeled productively (Williamson, 1981). Since this idealized homo 
economicus engages in rational cost-benefit analysis, the optimal institutional arrangement 
imposes visible sanctions against opportunism, thereby reducing transaction costs. 
Ostensibly, anything short of a formalized rules-based system is deemed to constitute a void. 
Yet, as the term institutional void becomes subject to conceptual stretching, we note 
a problem with terminology: the mobilization of the term ‘void’ implies that something is 
not, but should be present. A peer in one of our doctoral seminars, tasked with discussing an 
institutional void article, stated flatly, ‘this article offended me’ because her home country 
was labelled as a setting rife with institutional voids. As such, it is a concept that veils strong 
normative assumptions under a cloak of objectivity. We detail more specific ontological 
assumptions revealed through usage of the term: 
i) Market Primacy. Within the set of Western values that dominate management and 
organization studies, the market, and its set of supporting institutions, take priority. For 
example, Khanna and Palepu (2010: 35) state that ‘aggressive state mandates can sometimes 
be more effective than the democratic process in implementing institutional change [enabling 
market activity]’. Conversely, where state law is nebulously deemed ‘overly enforced and 
over-tight’ in terms of constraining market participants’ freedom, informal institutions that 
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help actors ‘getting around the formal rules‘ – i.e. circumventing the law – are considered 
desirable (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). This illustrates an apparent internal contradiction in 
institutional voids, namely that it underscores the importance of a legal order and the rule of 
law for a functioning market economy, but promotes undermining the very same rule of law 
and democracy when these are used to restrain markets. To quote the economist Murrary 
Rothbard, ‘what is so terrible about transaction costs? On what basis are they considered the 
ultimate evil, so that their minimization must override all other considerations of choice, 
freedom, and justice?’ (Rothbard, 1981, p. 547). 
ii) Irrelevance of informal institutions. Scholars using the term institutional void largely 
reserve the term ‘institution’ for formalized, market supporting institutions, citing property 
rights, financial access, rule-of-law and courts as the most common examples (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2010). In setting the US as a baseline, scholars also tend to bias their analyses to 
favor Western market-enabling institutions. Consultancies, for instance, are treated as 
necessary information intermediaries that facilitate efficient market activity (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997) which in turn, favors other complementary, American-dominated institutions 
such as the business school (Kipping & Engwall, 2002). 
While these conceptual choices are appealing for analytical reasons, they are 
problematic insofar as they unduly reduce the range of legitimate institutional arrangements 
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to a narrow subset of Western-style institutions in the liberal tradition. Informal and cultural 
institutions are given only token recognition or derided as ‘barriers’ to good governance 
practices (e.g. Cumming, Filatotchev, Knill, Reeb, & Senbet, 2017). As a result, the term 
institutional void occludes from analysis other obvious and rich institutions (e.g. culture, 
family, religion) that impact organizations in ways that cannot be captured by transaction 
cost explanations. For instance, given the embeddedness of family firms – both Western and 
non-Western – it seems equally (if not more) plausible that such firms would prioritize 
organization around kinship or political concerns rather than efficiency (Yiu, Lu, Bruton, & 
Hoskisson, 2007), with the latter being only a positive externality. Within the dominant 
narratives surrounding the term, such non-market arrangements only merit consideration 
insofar as they have an impact on cost (e.g. through compensatory behaviours such as trust). 
Furthermore, the narrow focus on transactioning impedes investigation into the trade-
offs involved in market development. Formal markets themselves may create institutional 
voids in social and cultural relations (Banerjee & Jackson, 2016; Mishra, 2017). For example, 
anthropologists demonstrate how the introduction of arm’s-length transactions has 
historically eliminated pre-existing social and trust-based arrangements in local communities 
(Graeber, 2014). Similarly, formal institutions may be avoided intentionally: in Confucian 
tradition, the need for laws is often interpreted as a failure of that society’s moral standards 
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(Lau & Young, 2013). In this view, laws, not informal institutions are substitutes. By 
focusing on formalized economic exchange though, the externalities imposed upon informal 
arrangements by the market become obscured. 
iii) Indigenous organizations and practices as ‘incomplete’. The assumptions embedded in 
institutional voids suggest that local organizing principles (e.g. business group affiliation or 
state involvement) emerge as makeshift responses to flawed institutions. The term 
‘bricolage’, for instance, is often used to characterize the efforts of local entrepreneurs (Baker 
& Nelson, 2005; Mair & Marti, 2009), but this suggests second-best solutions are ‘cobbled 
together’ from available resources rather than legitimate practices in their own right. Many 
indigenous forms and behaviours are historically grounded in the context in which they 
emerged. Far before the advent of formalized markets, practices such as gift-giving, empathy, 
and benevolence structured exchange in many societies; many continue to operate in the same 
way (Graeber, 2014). 
The result of the ontological assumptions stemming from the term institutional void 
is a form of conceptual imperialism. Recent scholarship in top management journals 
continues to uncritically promote emulation of Western market and corporate governance 
institutions. Cumming et al. (2017) coin the term ‘governance mobility’ to promote the export 
of Western corporate governance rules to fill institutional voids. The authors propose that 
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‘[p]olicymakers should work to encourage mobility of governance’ with support from 
‘international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank [who] can be 
transmission sources of governance for developing economies’ (Cumming et al., 2017). Yet, 
this optimistic belief in the possibility and desirability of exporting legal and market 
institutions ignores decades of literature on the problems associated with ‘legal transplants’ 
from the West to the rest (e.g. Pistor & Berkowitz, 2003).  
 
Salvaging institutional voids? Gaps, swamps, and interfaces 
As institutional voids stretch conceptually and spread in usage, some authors have 
acknowledged the shortcomings of the term and have attempted to refine the concept. Some 
entrepreneurship scholars, for example, helpfully use more specific language such as ‘formal 
institutional voids’ to qualify their scope to legal and enforcement institutions (Puffer, 
McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010; Sutter, Webb, Kistruck, & Bailey, 2013). Alternatively, in a 
recent attempt to rectify the conceptual shortcomings of institutional voids, Olthaar et al. 
(2017) coin the also rather disparaging term ‘institutional swamp‘ to capture the complexity 
and richness of institutional fabrics in non-Western countries. Meanwhile, scholars in 
Corporate Social Responsibility employ the term ‘governance gaps’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011) to designate the outcomes of the nation-state’s declining legal and democratic control 
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over corporate activity. Although the notion does not privilege a priori any specific content 
of the desired governance arrangement, it is still based on the idea that something ‘is not’ but 
‘ought to be’ there and dismisses the possibility that economic activities and exchange may 
be regulated in ways other than through a formalized regulatory order. Therefore, although 
‘governance gaps’ and ‘formal institutional voids’ are a step in the right direction, even these 
approaches are still rather ethnocentric and ultimately lacking in conceptual precision. 
 To date, we find that the most promising refinement of the institutional void concept 
is Mair et al.’s (2012) reconceptualization of institutional void as interfaces between different 
institutional orders. Mair et al. (2012: 820) explictly reject the original, narrow view of 
institutional voids as spaces ‘empty of specific institutions’. Instead, they acknowledge 
institutional plurality and see voids as ‘the intermediate outcome of conflict and contradiction 
among’ different institutional orders such as the ‘local political, community, and religious 
spheres’ (Mair et al., 2012: 820).  
 Yet, like much of the entrepreneurship literature using the institutional void concept, 
this approach still presents market participation as an end in itself and market-based 
economic orders as an inevitable – if not necessarily desirable – end-point. Acknowledging 
the value of alternative arrangements as ‘intermediate outcomes’ along this path, the authors 
retain an evolutionary ontology towards a superior, more ideal economic order, namely the 
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market order. Local institutions, rather than constituting legitimate ways of organizing 
society and the economy, are explicitly considered as ‘not ideal’ (Mair et al. 2012: 843), but 
something ‘market-builders’ should acknowledge and use to promote Western-style markets 
with perhaps a bit of local flair. 
 Recasting institutional voids as institutional interfaces is an important shift from the 
original, ‘absolutist’ conception of institutional voids towards a relativist conception (i.e. 
alternative orders have value insofar as they can support the emergence of a market order). 
In this sense, the ethnocentrism of the concept is diluted. Nonetheless, it fails to question the 
implicit normative hierarchy of institutional orders - an evolutionist view implying that 
history has a definitive direction from the primitive, the archaic, the underdeveloped (non-
markets) towards the sophisticated, the modern, the developed (markets). Clastres (1987) 
discerned in Western anthropologists a tendency to perceive other societies as the image of 
what we no longer are, and our societies as what other societies should strive to become. This 
biologist imagery – also reflected in labels such as “emerging” and “developing” economies 
– reinforces the view that the Western societies are the adult, the fully-fledged order, while 
‘developing’ countries are at a less advanced stage progressing in that right direction.  
 Mair et al.’s (2012) objective is to understand how markets can be made more 
inclusive by empowering women to participate in the emerging market order in rural 
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Bangladesh and thus obtain a fair share of the benefits of ‘development’. The inclusion of 
women in markets where they exist can hardly be criticized. Yet what the notion of 
institutional voids surmises is that we agree that the emergence of a market order is a 
desirable goal for rural Bangladesh. But what if we do not? What if we have doubts whether 
integration in a market-based world economy is the only ‘way forward’ for all regions, 
countries, and communities in the world? While market mechanisms may allow communities 
to address non-financial issues (e.g. gender discrimination or poverty) through market 
solutions (Banerjee & Jackson, 2016; Mair & Marti, 2009), it does not follow that non-market 
solutions are inferior or less legitimate per se. It is at that level of disagreement that the 
institutional void concept – whether in its weak (relativist) or its strong (absolutist) 
formulation – becomes fundamentally problematic. 
 
A better future: decolonizing institutional voids and creating inclusive concepts  
Given the disquieting evolution of institutional voids and the insufficient remedies, 
how should we proceed? We advocate for management and organization scholars to engage 
in an epistemological rupture (Bachelard, 1938) to explicitly and fundamentally rethink the 
position of the Western scholar when studying other parts of the world. An epistemological 
rupture requires systematically questioning our deeply embedded assumptions and seeking 
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to break free of these entrenched bonds. So what does an epistemological rupture look like 
in practice? We offer some initial steps forward:  
Void institutional voids. Although efforts to introduce contextualization in 
management and organizational scholarship are important, this task is hardly possible 
through an umbrella term like institutional voids. Accordingly, tinkering with a 
fundamentally flawed concept that is rooted in a ethnocentric approach to management and 
organization studies will not solve the problem. As a starting point we thus propose dropping 
institutional voids from our academic lexicon. Further, we doubt that discovery of a ‘better’ 
concept will be possible or useful; an epistemological rupture means developing a new 
lexicon to describe non-Western contexts that emerges more organically from a rich 
understanding of local settings. 
 Embrace teleological diversity. We need to reckon with the ontological assumption 
– deeply embedded in much of management and organization studies – that formal market 
development is the most important societal goal. Indeed, we should question market 
development that facilitates economic inequality and reduces societal health (Pickett and 
Wilkinson, 2015) and happiness (Alesina, Di Tella, & MacCulloch, 2004). Relatedly, we 
must recognize that the market facilitating Rule-of-Law (including the preference for 
publicly known, fixed and non-arbitrary rules) is a construct rooted in the Western 
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Enlightenment tradition, while other parts of the world may rely on unwritten social norms 
to guide behaviours (Jacques, 2009). To a Western scholar, a moral order may appear as an 
institutional void to be rectified, while to an observer from a non-western country, it may 
plausibly appear as a sign of a healthy society based on a functioning moral order (Lau & 
Young, 2013; Peerenboom, 2002).  
 Our research, as organization scholars, should consider and appreciate alternative 
societal goals. Embracing teleological diversity might further help to avoid the problematic 
elevation of Western economies to a gold standard while caricaturizing non-Western 
economies according to their supposed weaknesses. Indeed, new concepts can invert this 
formula: non-Western economies can have institutional strengths that Western economies 
lack, a fact that should be reflected in our academic lexicon. The new realities of the global 
economy require scholars in Western-dominated academia to rethink comparative analysis 
beyond facile benchmarking. Indeed, an epistemological rupture consists of abandoning the 
idea of a linear evolution of institutional orders or even a hierarchy among them.  
 Appreciate informal institutions. A singular focus on market-creating legal 
institutions obscures and denigrates the vibrant array of alternative institutions that 
nonetheless facilite exchange (Ledeneva, 2018). Indeed, we may well attribute the economic 
development of the United States to a work ethic derived from a religious institutional order 
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(Weber, 1958) or to heavy state intervention (Mazzucato, 2015). Yet such influences are not 
captured from an institutional void perspective. There is much work to be done to uncover 
the prevalence, complexity, and power of informal institutions such as those embedded in 
family, religion, community, and culture. In this way, we also aim for researchers to 
recognize formal Western, market-oriented institutional arrangements as not an ideal end-
state, but as one possible permutation of a broad array of institutional building blocks. 
 Conduct context-driven research. An epistemological rupture means considering that 
accumulated management and organization theory (including but not limited to institutional 
voids) may actually be hindering authentic understanding of non-Western contexts. Instead, 
we advocate building theory from the ground up with a close connection to the context. 
Although it is impossible for a researcher to enter a context as a blank slate (Suddaby, 2006), 
grounded theory requires that the fieldworker enter a context with the intention to ‘make the 
familiar strange rather than the strange familiar’ (van Maanen, 1995, p. 20). In other words, 
rather than traveling the world like an (academic) tourist who only ‘sees what he came to 
see’ – which in turn is determined by expectations, preconceptions and prejudices – we 
should become travelers ‘who see what they [locals] see’ (Chesterton, 2006[1936]: 305). 
Current research emphasizes contextualizing theory through stretching and retrofitting 
Western academic concepts; future research should develop concepts that more carefully 
 
 
27
capture the institutional fabric present in a given environment. In doing so, not only does an 
epistemological rupture in research culture allow us to truly understand other countries’ 
institutional arrangements, it will also ultimately allow us to better understand our own. To 
paraphrase G.K. Chesterton once again, ‘[t]he whole object of travel is not to set foot on 
foreign land; it is at last to set foot on one’s own country as a foreign land’ (Chesterton, 
2007[1909]:93).  
 Develop an inclusive research community. While perhaps not quite as overtly 
offensive as ‘shithole country’, ‘institutional void’ is still a stark and loaded term. Words 
matter. Using value-laden language not only poses an obstacle to building a collegial and 
vibrant intellectual community across peers from diverse cultural backgrounds, it also 
threatens the integrity of theoretical development itself. How can we truly understand the 
complexity and richness of phenomena in non-Western economies, let alone build sound 
theory to explain it, if our vocabulary is patronizing to those best suited to engage in this 
theorizing? We must bring in local scholars to allow indigenous theorization (Nkomo, 2017). 
As our profession seeks to explain increasingly diverse phenomena and context, we need to 
build our reflective capabilities, be inclusive in our approach, and conscientious of the power 
of the language we use. These principes are far from the final word, though hopefully, they 
are a start. 
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Figure 1. Growth in the use of the term institutional voids 
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Figure 2. Countries/regions cited as institutional voids 
 
